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This paper investigates the presence and significance of bank lending channel of the 
monetary policy transmission in India and Pakistan using the Structural Vector Auto 
Regression (SVAR) approach. The results of econometric analysis support the presence 
of a significant bank lending channel in these countries. Changes in the monetary policy 
instruments affect the credit variable (private sector claims) which in turn transmits the 
shocks to the real side of the economy, i.e. output and prices. The output returns back to 
initial level in long run, while the effect of monetary policy changes on prices are 
persistent.  
 
I also find that compared to the bank lending in other developing countries the channel in 
these countries is different and more vital. Another finding is that apart from interest 
rates, money also seems to play an important role in these economies and its shocks are 
significantly transmitted to the real macroeconomic activities through changes in the 
credit variable. 
 The mechanism by which monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy 
remains a central topic of debate in macroeconomics. Considerable research has recently 
examined the role played by banks in the transmission of monetary policy aiming at 
uncovering a credit channel and assessing the relative importance of the money and credit 
channels.
1 Distinguishing the relative importance of the money and credit channels is 
useful for various reasons. First, understanding which financial aggregates are impacted 
by monetary policy would improve our understanding of the link between the financial 
and the real sectors of the economy. Second, a better understanding of the transmission 
mechanism would help monetary authorities and analysts to interpret movements in 
financial aggregates. Finally, more information about the transmission mechanism might 
lead to a better choice of intermediate targets.2 In particular, if the credit channel is an 
important part of the transmission mechanism, then the banks’ asset items should be the 
focus of more attention. 
This paper focuses on determining the presence and significance of the bank 
lending channel for India and Pakistan.  
Various econometric methodologies can be used to identify the presence and 
significance of this channel.3 The traditional dynamic simultaneous model approach uses 
the system of equation to define a set of endogenous variables in terms of exogenous 
variables and lags of endogenous variables. One of the major problems in this approach is 
the difficulty of identifying truly exogenous variables that can be used as instruments. 
Moreover, for the same reasons it is hard to justify on a priori grounds that a given 
variable has no influence on another variable. That is, there are hardly any compelling 
identifying restrictions.  
In response to these difficulties, Structural Vector Auto Regression (SVAR) 
models treat all variables as endogenous. The sampling information in the data is 
modeled with the help of VAR models, which model each variable as a function of all 
other variables. Having modeled the reduced form of the model with the help of a VAR 
system, the SVAR analysis proceeds to identify the model. To this end a ‘reaction 
function in surprises’ is modeled, which expresses unexpected changes in the policy 
instrument as a function of unexpected changes in the non-policy variable and of 
monetary policy shocks. The objective is to identify the monetary policy shocks from this 
relation, which represent the discretionary component of policy.  
Given these advantages, the paper also uses the SVAR methodology. Using the 
data for the economies of India and Pakistan, a model is constructed consisting of 
production, consumer prices, demand deposits, claims on private sectors, money (each in 
log level), exchange rate, interest rate and spread. The model is analyzed using the 
impulse responses and SVAR estimation (both short term and long term restriction results 
are discussed). 
The rest of paper is organized in following way. Some of the interesting facts and 
figures about the unique banking structure of less developed countries are mentioned in 
section I. It also provides brief history and current trends of banking sector in India and 
Pakistan. The paper analyzes the different determinants of bank lending channel next. 
Section II describes theoretical background behind bank lending/ credit channel in detail. 
Section III talks about the dataset and variables used for the analysis. Section 5 reports 
the econometric results. Then paper deals with the analysis of the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on bank lending. Section 6 introduces the Vector Autoregressive 
Regression (VAR) method in brief. Section 7 discusses the different econometric 
approaches used to solve the identification problem. In section 8 a VAR model is setup 
and then its estimation (using E-Views software) results are shown. Part IV of the paper 
discusses and analyzes the results. The results of this paper for India and Pakistan are 
compared with results from developed and other developing countries. The paper 
concludes with summarizing the findings and mentioning the directions for future work. 
I. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Many of the recent research papers have established the importance of financial 
sector development for economic growth.4 They have found that measures of the size of 
the banking sector and the size and liquidity of the stock market are highly correlated 
with subsequent GDP per capita growth. Moreover, emerging evidence suggests that both 
the level of banking sector development and stock market development exert a causal 
impact on economic growth. Recent financial crises in South East Asia and Latin 
America further underline the importance of a well-functioning financial sector for the 
whole economy.  Some of the important highlights of the banking sector in “Less 
Developed Countries” (as defined by World Bank) are noted below. 
A) Stylized facts on Banking Sector in LDCs  
Unlike the developed countries, the financial sector in developing countries (or 
LDCs) is still not mature enough. This contrast is evident from various measures like the 
size, activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets. For example 
according to US Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S Business 2001; the number of 
commercial banking firms was 7419. Compared to this number of commercial banks in 
India is 293 (source: Reserve Bank of India, June 2003) and the total number of 
scheduled banks in Pakistan is 46, including 22 foreign banks (based on Banking 
Statistics of Pakistan, 2002 & 2003, published by State Bank of Pakistan). 
Based on the data from the World Bank and other sources, some stylized facts on 
banking sectors (in Less Developed Countries) can be noticed easily. 
1. The first major point that differentiates developing countries from developed 
countries, such as United States, is the lack of legal enforcement of financial markets’ 
rules and regulations. In LDCs collateral is scarce and contract enforcement is weak. 
There is less collateralizable wealth, which results in borrower being charged higher 
interest rate or rationed out of the market all together. Similarly the information is 
scarce. Hence the contracts are much harder to enforce and borrowers can wilfully 
refuse to pay back a loan without legally enforceable recourse. Moreover, in most 
LDCs, it is difficult to seize collateral, resell it and/ or to use legal action to collect 
bad debt. 
2. The other observation is about interest rates. Compared to developed countries, 
developing countries have a lot of variations in interest rates. For example the real 
interest rates on deposits are either very high (Brazil 47%) or very low (Zimbabwe 
19%). The average real interest rate on deposits for less developed countries is around 
10.9%, while it is just 6.3% for developed countries. But more striking is the variation 
in these rates5. The variance of developed countries is 28.7, while for LDCs this is 
close to 115. 
3. Another noticeable trend in LDCs is considerably high spreads and high interest rates 
being charged on the loans. Some of the probable reasons for spreads being higher are 
lack of enforceable and marketable collateral, high loan default probabilities and high 
bank operation costs. The average spread for developed countries is around 4.4% 
while it is 10.4% for LDCs. Similarly the variance for developed countries is just 4.6 
compared to 65 for less developed countries. 
4. In most LDCs, banks dominate the financial system; equity (stock) markets and 
corporate bond markets remain very shallow, concentrated and illiquid. Stock market 
value to GDP ratio in 2003 was 2.88 for US and 1.3 for UK, while for India and 
Pakistan this ratio was 0.5 and 0.2 respectively. 
5. The ratio of private sector loans to GDP is very low (around 10%) for LDCs as 
compared to developed countries, where it is almost 60%. This along with the fact 
that equity and debt markets are shallow in LDCs leads to the trend that firms in 
LDCs are more likely to depend on internal finance. 
6. As a consequence of all these factors, it is not possible for small private banks to 
operate profitably in less developed countries. Hence central banks and government 
banks are very powerful. For example, in 2003 the assets of three largest banks as a 
share of assets of all commercial banks for India and Pakistan is quite high (0.48 and 
0.57) compared to US and UK (0.28 and 0.27). This means that there are few large 
banks dominating the banking sector rather than a large number of small and medium 
sized banks in these countries.  
As documented by these stylized facts, there are institutional differences between 
industrialized countries and LDCs. So the bank lending channel may differ between the 
two groups. Therefore, the paper attempts to investigate the bank lending channel in 
atypical countries not examined in previous literature. 
 India and Pakistan are chosen as the representatives of these LDCs. These two 
countries add few interesting directions to the study. Both the countries got independence 
at the same time and had similar social and economic condition. But, India followed a 
socialist approach to the economic development in the beginning opening the economy in 
1990s while Pakistan has had an open market policy from start. Thus, the results for India 
and Pakistan could be similar or contrasting or both. These countries offer the potential to 
provide some insights into the relative merits of different policies. 
B)  Institutional background of the banking sector in Pakistan  
Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s had a liberalized banking structure open to both 
foreign and domestic banks. However, this changed in the early 1970s when the 
government decided to nationalize all private domestic banks in the country. The 
nationalization was interesting in the sense that only the domestic banks were 
nationalized. The foreign banks were left to operate as before, although limits were 
placed on the size of their operation. As a result of this institutional history, all foreign 
banks operating in Pakistan were set up as new banks, i.e. none of them were buyouts of 
existing private domestic banks. By 1990 government banks dominated the banking 
sector as they held 92.2% of total assets, while the rest belonged to foreign banks.  
However, weaknesses and inefficiencies in the financial structure that emerged 
after nationalization, finally forced the government to initiate a broad based program of 
reforms in the financial sector in the beginning of 1991. These reforms included: (i) 
privatization of one of the government banks, (ii) allowing entry of new private domestic 
and foreign banks, (iii) setting up of a centralized credit information bureau (CIB) to 
track loan-level default and other information, (iv) issuance of new prudential regulations 
to bring supervision guidelines in-line with international banking practices (Basel 
accord), and (v) granting autonomy to the State Bank of Pakistan that regulates all banks. 
As a result of these reforms, the country saw a spur of growth in the private (particularly 
domestic) banking sector. 
During the fiscal year 20036, even a strong 28.9 percent growth in net government 
borrowings from scheduled bank, and a stunning 284.9 percent rise in private sector 
credit, could not contain downward trend in interest rates for the second successive year 
– the weighted average auction yield for the benchmark 6- month T-bills fell 463 basis 
points during the year, taking the cumulative decline for the two years to a massive 1090 
basis points. Fiscal year 2003 was as an exceptionally good year for the banking sector, 
as the important banking indicators witnessed further improvement over fiscal year 2002. 
Deposits of the banking sector grew by 19.5 percent (or Rs 275.1 billion) over the already 
strong double-digit increases in the preceding two years. This impressive deposit growth 
was largely driven by the unprecedented increase in workers’ remittances, which reached 
US$ 4.2 billion during FY03 – the highest one-year accumulation in the history of 
Pakistan. 
C) Evolution of the Indian Banking Sector  
Independent India inherited a weak financial system. Commercial banks 
mobilized household savings through demand and term deposits, and disbursed credit 
primarily to large corporations.  Indeed, between the years 1951 and 1968, the proportion 
of credit going to industry and trade increased from an already high 83 percent to 90 
percent. This increase was at the expense of some crucial segment of the economy like 
agriculture and the small-scale industrial sector. This skewed pattern of credit disbursal, 
and perhaps the spate of bank failures during the sixties, forced the government to resort 
to nationalization of banks in 1969. 
However, despite the successes of bank nationalization in India, the banking 
sector remained mired in problems, and was incompatible with the emphasis on a market 
economy, which was gradually emerging as the dominant economic paradigm worldwide. 
With economic reform emerging as the primary agenda of the central government in 
1990, the banking-financial sector in India witnessed a significant degree of liberalization 
since the early nineties. Between 1992 and 1997, interest rates were liberalized, and 
banks were allowed to fix lending rates subject to a cap of 400 basis points over the 
prime lending rate (PLR). 
Monetary conditions closely tracked the evolution of real activity during 2002-
037. The growth of non-food bank credit, inclusive of banks’ investments in non-
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (non-SLR) instruments, was in consonance with the recovery of 
industrial output. Credit expansion was facilitated by conditions of ample liquidity in 
financial markets, engendered by massive capital inflows. Interest rates declined across 
the spectrum in response to the easy liquidity conditions. On the other hand, currency and 
deposit growth slowed down moderately reflecting the adverse impact of the drought on 
rural incomes and the lowering of deposit rates by banks. Broad money growth reflected 
these diverse impulses from real activity. Financial markets were flush with liquidity over 
the greater part of 2002-03, bolstered by sustained capital inflows and a liquidity 
overhang. There was a general easing of market conditions in terms of turnover and rates, 
the latter enabled by the accommodative monetary policy stance.  
These observations, facts, figures and numbers present a very interesting picture 
of economies of less developed countries. Existence of bank lending channel as an 
independent monetary policy transmission mechanism in developed countries has been 
shown by various researches. However this kind of literature is scarce for less developed 
countries. This paper applies the established theories and econometric methodologies of 
determining the presence and significance of bank lending channel for India and 
Pakistan. 
II: Determinants of Bank Lending Channel  
Bank lending has been a major area of research in recent years due to its 
importance and the issues surrounding it. For example, following changes in monetary 
policy strong correlation between bank loans and unemployment, GNP, and other key 
macroeconomic indicators is observed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). However, such 
correlations could arise even if the “bank lending channel” is not operative. Since 
contraction of bank loans in the wake of tight money cannot be unambiguous evidence 
for the lending view. This is primarily due to high correlation between monetary and 
credit aggregates. When bank loans contract, deposits are also likely to contract. 
Therefore, one can argue that a monetary tightening depresses aggregate demand through 
the conventional money channel resulting in a decrease of demand for bank loans (i.e. the 
money view). In other words, it is necessary to identify the shifts of the supply and 
demand schedules in the bank loan market. Thus, the contraction of bank loans is 
consistent with the lending view as well as the money view. This observational 
equivalence is called the ‘supply-versus-demand puzzle’. The supply-versus-demand 
puzzle has made it common to test the lending view, particularly in the US literature, by 
examining the responses of banks to monetary policy with micro-data on banks’ balance 
sheets (e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 2000).  
Hence unlike the traditional theory that emphasizes households’ preferences 
between money and other less liquid assets, the new theory of monetary policy asserts 
that the role of the banking sector is central to the transmission of monetary policy. The 
bank lending channel can be summarized as the impact of monetary policy on the amount 
and conditions of credit as supplied by the banking sector. Monetary policy actions get 
transmitted to the real economy through these changes in the loan supply behavior of 
banks. 
A. Data Set and Preparation  
To test the bank lending channel for India and Pakistan the paper uses the 
macroeconomic data since micro-level data is not available. The Statistics Department of 
the International Monetary Fund publishes the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database8. The data used here is taken from the Country Tables of the International 
Financial Statistics for India and Pakistan. The data for interest rate, exchange rate, CPI, 
bank loans, industrial production etc is taken on Quarterly basis. These series run from 
Q1:1957 to Q1:2004, but some data is available only for few years in between. Hence the 
effective estimation period varies. 
For India interest rates available are Bank Rate, Money Market Rate and Lending Rate, 
while for Pakistan Discount Rate, Money Market Rate, Treasury Bill Rate and 
Government Bond Yields are published. As a measure of real economic activity, 
Industrial Production is used for India and Manufacturing Production is used Pakistan. 
Money is used as the monetary aggregate and consumer prices are used as a measure of 
general price level in the economy. Exchange rate against US dollar is also used to take 
care of the external effects on the economy. 
 The data is analyzed and plotted to see if there are any obvious trends between 
these variables. In both the countries the interest rates have fluctuated a lot and there 
seem to be no clear directions of movement to determine the intended monetary policy 
measures. But a general trend can be seen, for instance it starts slowly going up from 
1960s to 1980s, and then a sudden jump in early 1990s with abrupt fall in late 1990s. 
Similarly the consumer prices have constantly moved up with slope increasing 
significantly after 1980s (as can be seen in figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1: Different Nominal Interest Rates Movements 
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Figure 2: Consumer Prices Movements 
 
 
As discussed earlier, to test the bank lending channel view one needs to focus on 
finding answers of the following questions.   
1. Do banks change their supply of loans when monetary policy changes? 
2. Does spending respond to changes in bank loan supply? 
 
On analyzing the sample data for these questions, definite trends in different 
macroeconomic variables can be spotted. For example in both countries money, demand 
deposit and private sector claims move along together (figure 3). Similarly for Pakistan, 
private sector claims and manufacturing production seem to be correlated. This 
correlation is not that linear in the case of India (figure 4). 
 Figure 1: Money, Private Sector Claims and Demand Deposit 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Private Sector Claims Vs. Output (Industrial / Manufacturing Production) 
 
 Notice that in figure 3, there is a small-period sudden drop in log deposit variables 
during 1970 and again in 1980 for India. Interestingly, in 1970 the ruling regime changed 
from Congress to Janata Party. The new government was expected to change all the 
policies supported by previous government and there was a general sense of political 
instability. This sudden drop may be due to that volatility. Similarly, in 1980 Congress 
formed the government with a majority. 
Similarly, a positive movement in the spread simply reflects that the monetary 
tightening is inducing a fall in long-term rates, since there are expectations of a drop in 
the short-term interest rate in the near future. On plotting different spreads, the effect of 
interest rate movements on demand deposit and private sector claims does not seem to be 
obvious.  
 
 
Figure 3: Interest Rate Spread Vs. Deposits and Loans 
 
These observations indicate the existence of few relationships between these 
variables. The money and private sector loans are moving together for almost all of the 
period. Similarly private sector loans and production are also moving together. This 
suggests that over time changes in money are always accompanied by changes in private 
sector loans and production, implying that these three variables are very closely related. 
Hence there should be some relationships between these variables by which changes in 
money are causing private sector loans to change which in turn is affecting the 
production. But this simple analysis is not sufficient. Is it actually the changes in money 
which cause private sector loans to change or both these are affected by some other 
factors? There is a need to identify these relationships, to check if the relationships are in 
agreement with the bank lending view and to see whether or not those are significant. 
B. Preliminary Investigation 
Proceeding further to investigate the bank lending channel in India and Pakistan, the 
time series data mentioned in previous section is regressed to identify the presence and 
significance of any relationships indicating the bank lending.  
One of the issues involved in identifying the probable determinants of bank lending 
channel is the “Problem of identification”, that is, without an exogenous shock to either 
credit demand or credit supply, the system of two equations (one for credit supply and 
another for credit demand) can not be estimated. For this to be properly resolved there 
must be at least one variable present only in one of the supply or demand function 
(Barajas & Steiner, 2002). The demand equation is identified if there is a variable present 
in the supply equation that is not present in the demand equation. Similarly, the supply 
equation is identified if there is a variable present in the demand equation that is not 
present in the supply equation. Hence the major question becomes what macroeconomic 
indicators can be taken as a measure of credit supply.  
Due to non-availability of micro-level data, the loan demand and loan supply can not 
be identified separately. The “claims on private sector” (monetary survey data of IFS 
publication) consolidates monetary authorities’ and deposit money banks’ data for private 
loans in these countries. It indicates the equilibrium value between loan demand and loan 
supply. This is the “credit variable” used in this paper, representing the bank lending.  
Another major assumption is that the paper treats money and interest rate both as 
the monetary policy instruments in India and Pakistan. The reason is that the 
governments of these countries have extensively used printing of new currency as a way 
to finance the budget deficits. Unlike developed countries, the budget and the proposed 
deficit have major impact on the economic decision making of agents in these countries 
(especially for the case of India). 
As mentioned in previous sections the flow of causality between the variables as 
suggested by theory should be two folds. The changes in monetary policy should cause 
changes in loan supply. This in turn should have significant effect on real economic 
activity. Hence the major relationships for bank lending channel to be operative are: 
1. Monetary Policy Instruments Æ Bank Credit 
2. Bank Credit Æ Macroeconomic Activity 
Two OLS regressions are run to identify the first relationship. The credit variable 
(log private sector claims) is the dependent variable and each of the monetary policy 
instruments (money, bank rate/ discount rate) is used as the explanatory variable. The 
results are shown in table 1 below. Please note that private loans and money are in log 
form. A time trend is also added in the second regression.  
The second part of the channel is the affect of changes on this credit variable 
(private loans) on real macroeconomic activities (industrial/ manufacturing 
production).The results for simple OLS for this hypothesized relationship are shown in 
table 2. Log value is taken for both the variables.  
   India Pakistan 
 Dependant 
Variable 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
1. Pvt. Loans Money 1.246181 
( 0.010057 ) 
R2 = 0.988095 
Money 1.158518 
( 0.012354) 
R2 =  0.979177 
2. Pvt. Loans Bank Rate 0.419237 
(0.095012) 
R2= 0.438146 
Discount Rate 1.081293 
(0.037859) 
R2= 0.719822 
Table 1: OLS results for effect of monetary policy on credit variable 
 
 
  India Pakistan 
 Dependant 
Variable 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
1. Production Pvt. Loans 0.358788 
( 0.003492 ) 
R2 = 0.983874 
Pvt. Loans 0.446374 
( 0.005961) 
R2 =  0.973950 
Table 2: OLS Results for effect of credit variable of real output 
 On analyzing the above results, we find that: 
1. Coefficient of relationship between money and private sector claims is significant, 
and has a very high explanatory power (based on R-squared statistics). 
2. Similarly coefficient of interest rate on private sector claims (loans) is significant, 
but its explanatory power is not as high as that of the relationship with money. 
The R2 is much smaller for the case of India. 
3. The coefficient of private sector loans on production is significant and explains 
most of the variations in the production.  
 The first two findings show that the relationships between monetary policy variables 
and credit variable exist in these countries. However, the relationships of credit variable 
with money are more significant than relationship of credit variable with interest rates. 
Also the relationship between bank rate and credit variable is not very strong in India. 
The last finding indicates that private borrowings affect the output (production). So 
the relationship between macroeconomic activity and credit variable also exists in these 
countries. 
 The paper now looks at different possible explanatory variables for this credit 
variable, to check if there are any alternative relationships present in these economies. 
Some of the obvious choices for explanatory variables (based on theoretical foundations 
discussed above and on previous works) are Lending Rate, Deposit Rate, Spread, 
overhead costs, GDP, inflation, stock market index, liquid liabilities (as % of assets), 
lending capacity, non-performing loans or bank assets as % of central bank assets etc. But 
many of these choices involve micro level bank-panel data. Due to non-availability of 
that kind of data, this paper only uses money market rate, lending rate/ government bond 
yield and the spread. The log value of credit variable (private sector claims) is regressed 
on each of the above mentioned variables separately for both the countries. The results 
for each regression are shown in table 3. A time trend is added in each regression. 
On examining these relationships of credit variable with alternative instruments, 
the spread seem to have some explanatory power for the movements in private sector 
claims. However, the coefficient of determination for this relationship is less than the R2 
with money as explanatory variable (which was around 0.98 for both the countries). 
Similarly, the regression coefficients for other interest rates are significant, but have 
small explanatory power. 
Till now the paper has used “private sector loans” as the indicator of bank lending 
channel. Another indicator of bank lending may be “Investment Share of Gross Domestic 
Product per Capita”. The argument is that movements in macroeconomic activities can 
have a time trend associated with it, and this is especially true for the case of developing 
countries. This would mean that changes in credit supply due to monetary policy shocks 
may change the real macroeconomic activity via the investment share of GDP per capita. 
Hence taking the percentage share of investment rather than the actual value of 
investment may be a candidate for the credit variable. If there seem to be a significant 
relationship between this variable and the monetary policy instruments, then this may 
indicate the presence of a transmission channel. 
  India Pakistan 
 Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
1. Lending rate - 0.509019 
( 0.022782 ) 
R2 = 0.287015 
Govt. bond yield 0.549185 
( 0.031540) 
R2 =  0.416377 
2. Money market rate 0.352872 
(0.030218) 
R2= 0.436953 
Money market rate 0.409181 
(0.028160) 
R2= 0.319804 
3. Spread (bank rate & 
lending rate) 
-0.691344 
(0.021061) 
R2= 0.591561 
Spread (discount 
rate & govt. bond 
yield) 
0.516543 
(0.046309) 
R2= 0.308973 
Table 3: Relationship of Credit Variable with other possible instruments 
 
The data is taken from using the Penn World Tables9. Due to non-availability of the 
quarterly data, the yearly value is used for each of the four quarter. Separate regressions 
are run to identify if this variable, has the relationships with any of the other possible 
policy variables. The summary of least square regression results mentioning the 
coefficients are shown in table 4. 
The regression results indicate that bank interest rates or the spread does not have 
any significant relationship with the investment share of per capita gross domestic 
product. Hence this does not get affected by changes in monetary policy instruments and 
thus not an indicator of bank lending channel in these countries.  
To summarize, the preliminary investigation finds out that the credit variable 
(private sector loans) has a very significant relationship with monetary policy instruments 
for Pakistan. For India, the credit variable has a strong relationship with money but not 
with the interest rate. Moreover, the credit variable has a very high explanatory power 
(and significant relationship coefficient) with the macroeconomic activity (i.e. 
production) for both countries. This indicates that bank lending channel is present in 
these countries as a monetary policy transmission mechanism and it seems to be 
significant. Interest rate does not seem to affect the credit supply effectively in case of 
India. Any other alternative policy instrument - credit variable relationship does not seem 
to be significantly present in these economies. 
Given these encouraging indications, the paper proceeds to find out more detailed 
information about the presence of bank lending in India and Pakistan by applying the 
structural VAR methodology of monetary policy analysis 
 India Pakistan 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Bank Rate 0.023479 
(0.034374) 
R2=0.003470 
Discount Rate -0.146374 
(0.049574) 
R2= 0.047713 
Lending Rate -0.270386 
(0.045854) 
R2=0.285554 
Govt. bond yield 0.057877 
(0.092197) 
R2=0.002313 
Spread (bank 
rate & lending 
rate) 
-0.106169 
(0.060280) 
R2=0.034429 
Spread (discount rate 
& govt. bond yield) 
- 0.190090 
(0.054645) 
R2=0.066452 
Table 4:  Results for Investment Share regressed on different instruments 
III: Effect of a MP Shock on Bank Lending  
The VAR is a reduced-form time series model of the economy that is estimated by 
ordinary least squares. Initial interest in VARs arose because of the inability of 
economists to agree on the economy’s true structure.10 VAR methodologies11 for 
modeling the structure of an economy and issues involved in using those for the study of 
monetary policy analysis have also been popular research topic. 
A. Econometric Methodologies to the Analysis of Monetary Policy  
The criticism of the reduced form model approach led to the development of 
“Structural” VAR approach by Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986) and Sims 
(1986). This technique allows the researchers to use economic theory to transform the 
reduced-form VAR model into a system of structural equations. As discussed earlier a 
VAR is a system where each variable is regressed on k of its own lags as well as on k lags 
of the other variables (and a constant and a deterministic time trend, if necessary).  
To discuss the SVAR approach to identification, the structural model of economy 
is assumed to have the form – 
ΓYt = B(L)Yt + et ……………….(1) 
where B (L) denotes polynomials in the lag operator L and Σe is the variance-covariance 
matrix of the structural disturbances. The starting point of the SVAR analysis is the 
reduced form of (1), which in matrix notation is given by – 
Yt = Γ-1 B(L)Yt + Γ-1 et…………………..(2) 
Next, the moving average (MA) representation of the reduced form is computed, meaning 
that the system is re-parameterized to express the endogenous variables in Yt as a function 
of current and past reduced form innovations, ut. (ut = Γ-1 et ). 
Yt = C(L) ut …………………………..(3) 
with C(L) = ( I - Γ-1 B(L) )-1. A comparison of the MA representation with the 
conventional autoregressive (AR) representation shows that in the AR representation the 
each variable is expressed as a function of past values of all the variables, whereas in the 
MA representation each variable is expressed as a function of current and past 
innovations in u.  
Since no restrictions have yet been imposed on the model, it follows that the 
impulse response functions given by C do not have any economic meaning. In other 
words, even though they show the response of the economy to the reduced form 
disturbance u, this is not particularly interesting because these disturbances are devoid of 
economic content since they only represent a linear combination of the underlying 
structural innovations e, given by ut = Γ-1 et. Hence some restrictions need to be imposed 
to get the real economic relationships and responses. These are known as identifying 
restriction.12 
The identifying restrictions used in the SVAR model can be categorized as 
follows: 
1. Orthogonality Restrictions  
The identifying restriction that distinguishes the SVAR methodology from the 
traditional dynamic simultaneous equation approach is the assumption in SVAR models 
that the structural innovations are orthogonal, that is the covariance terms in Σe matrix are 
zero. Since the reduced form disturbance is linked to the structural innovation by Γu=e, 
the reduced form and the structural variance-covariance matrix are related to each other 
by ΓΣuΓ-1=Σe . From this it follows that the orthogonality restriction imposed on Σe leads 
to the non-linear restriction on Γ. 
To explain the intuition behind the orthogonality restriction in SVAR models, 
Bernanke (1986) writes that he thinks of the structural innovations “as ‘primitive’ 
exogenous forces, not directly observed by the econometrician, which buffet the system 
and cause oscillations. Because these shocks are primitive, i.e., they do not have common 
causes, it is natural to treat them as approximately uncorrelated.” 
2. Normalization  
SVAR models are based on the MA representation of the structural model, and 
the empirical analysis seeks to estimate the impulse response functions. The impulse 
response functions are usually computed to show the response of the model to a standard 
deviation shock to the structural innovations. This makes it convenient to normalize the 
SVAR model by setting the variances to one, because the standard deviation shocks, with 
this normalization, correspond to unit innovations in e. From this follows that the 
variance-covariance matrix of the structural innovations is Σe = I. 
3. Restrictions on Relationship matrix  
Finally exclusion restrictions are applied on matrix Γ for identifying the model 
exactly. The reason for stressing on the analysis of Γ is that SVAR models aim to identify 
the structural innovations e in order to trace out the dynamic responses of the model to 
these shocks, which yields the impulse response functions. To this end the SVAR model 
focuses on the relation Γut = et, and identifies the structural innovations by imposing 
suitable restrictions on Γ. Hence in other words we can say that in SVAR models the 
dynamic relationships in the economy are modeled as a relationship between shocks. 
Any exclusion restriction on Γ automatically imposes a recursive order on the 
system. This is called Choleski decomposition. Nevertheless, the Choleski decomposition 
represents just one possible strategy for the identification of a SVAR model and should 
only be employed when the recursive ordering implied by this identification scheme is 
firmly supported by theoretical considerations. Alternatives include non-recursive 
restrictions on the matrix Γ. Besides the restrictions on contemporaneous interactions it is 
also possible to impose long-run restrictions on the effects of structural shocks. Finally, it 
is also possible to combine contemporaneous and long-run restrictions.13 
Contemporaneous versus Long-run Identification Schemes  
A critical element in the estimation of the effects of policy shocks is the 
identification of these policy shocks, i.e. the determination of exogenous shocks to 
monetary policy. Two methods have been widely used in the VAR literature to identify 
structural shocks to monetary policy. One general approach employs restrictions on the 
contemporaneous relations among the variables of the vector autoregressive model, while 
the second general approach imposes restrictions on the long-run relations among the 
variables. Although economic and institutional arguments can be used to rationalize each 
identification scheme, there is no consensus as to which approach to identifying shocks is 
preferred, and the weaknesses of both approaches have been discussed in the research 
papers. For example, the structural VAR method developed by Shapiro and Watson 
(1988), utilizes long-run restrictions to identify the economic structure from the reduced 
form. Papers by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1992) stress the fact that long run 
restrictions are quite attractive for macroeconomic applications on real and nominal 
variables. The reasoning behind this argument is that economic theory itself suggests that 
nominal shocks have no long-run influence on real variables. 
Interpretation of SVAR Analysis  
It is tempting to use impulse response analysis to shed some light on the issue of 
how long it takes until a change in the monetary policy stance reaches its full effect on 
output, which is an important issue in applied business cycle analysis. But impulse 
response analysis is unlikely to be helpful in this regard, because most monetary policy 
actions represent a systematic response of the central bank to the state of the economy 
and do not come as surprises. That is, most monetary policy actions are not monetary 
policy shocks. It is therefore important for applied business cycle research to know what 
the output effects of systematic monetary policy are, while the output effects of 
unanticipated, discretionary monetary policy are only of secondary interest. But impulse 
response analysis only says something about the latter aspects, and remains largely silent 
on the output effects of systematic and hence anticipated monetary policy.  
The shock analysis conducted in SVAR models is the closest approximation of a 
controlled experiment available in empirical economics. Once the monetary policy shock 
is identified, one can see the monetary transmission mechanism unfold by observing the 
response of the non-policy variables to this monetary impulse. The issue of reverse 
causality which usually plagues the analysis of dynamic relationships is not an issue in 
SVAR models, because by tracing out the dynamics of the system to an unexpected 
shock the causality is pinned down and runs unambiguously from the monetary policy 
shock to the other variables in the model. This kind of structural inference is not possible 
using the conventional reduced form analysis of the lead/lag structure, which is often 
employed as an alternative tool to investigate the transmission mechanism. 
B. Detailed Estimation 
Before the specification of the VAR model for detailed estimation, it is important to 
recall that three necessary conditions need to be satisfied conceptually for the bank 
lending channel to be effectively operative. 
1. Firms must not be able to easily substitute bank loans with commercial paper or 
public equity (Kashyap, Wilcox & Stein, 1993).  
2. Central bank must be able to affect the supply of loans (Gertler & Gilchrist, 
1994). 
3. There should be nominal price rigidity, so that monetary policy can have real 
effects. 
The third condition exists in most of the economies. Due to semi-regulated 
environment of Indian and Pakistani economies (for example government decides the 
price of many basic things like petrol, food-grains etc.), nominal price rigidity can be 
assumed to be present.  As mentioned in section about less developed countries’ banking 
sector, the private bond and equity markets are still very immature in India and Pakistan. 
Hence the first condition is also met easily, because it is not possible for firms to sought 
loans from sources other than banks. The first condition, central bank’s ability to affect 
the supply of loans, can not be determined due to lack of firm level data. The paper 
however treats the changes in the private sector loans as the indication of changes in loan 
supply. As the preliminary investigation finds, changes in interest rates (and money) 
affect this credit variable. Hence the third condition is also satisfied (somewhat weakly 
for India). 
The VAR model in this paper consists of the macroeconomic series and bank data 
mentioned in previous part. The output is captured using the industrial or manufacturing 
production as a proxy for the macroeconomic activity. The annual currency depreciation 
is included using the exchange rate and movements in relative prices are captured by 
consumer prices. These two variables are intended to control for demand side of the 
economy. Similarly money and interest rate are used for money market and instrument of 
monetary policy. To identify the changes in loan demand and loan supply, claims on 
private sector and demand deposit are included in the system. The spread is also 
introduced in the model to disentangle the supply and demand.   
In a VAR, all contemporaneous correlation between two variables is attributed to the 
variable higher in the ordering. The paper uses a the following ordering – 
1. Log production. 2. Log CPI. 3. Log deposit. 4. Log Pvt. Loans. 
5. Exchange rate. 6. Spread. 7. Interest rate. 8. Log money. 
This kind of ordering is justified using the fact that since Bank Rate and Money are the 
policy variables, shocks in these affect output and prices with a lag via the changes in 
deposit, loans and exchange rate. 
1. Unrestricted VAR Estimation  
First, the unrestricted VAR model is estimated to further analyze the presence of 
bank lending channel and its role in transmission of monetary policy shocks.  
The lag length selection tests for India suggested using either 4 (the sequential 
modified LR test statistic and final prediction error) or just 1 (Schwarz information 
criteria) lags. For Pakistan the ideal lag length suggested by tests (LR, FPE, AIC) is 5 or 
1 (SC). Since using four lag also takes care of seasonality in the quarterly data being used 
here, the optimal number of lags is taken as 4.  
The VAR models for both the countries are stable. Since all the AR roots have 
modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle.  
To assess the importance of bank lending channel one needs to test for the marginal 
predictive power of the “credit variable” by carrying out Granger causality tests14. This 
evidence alone is not sufficient. It has to be complemented with two simultaneous 
conditions: 
• The money and/ or interest rate (or term spread) is relevant for predicting the 
credit variable, signifying the monetary policy affecting the bank lending. 
• This credit variable should be relevant for explaining the macroeconomic activity 
variable, implying that this channel has transmitted the monetary policy changes 
to real economy. 
1.1 Pair-wise Granger Causality15 
The simplest way to get the answer for the question “does the bank lending channel 
play any significant macroeconomic role as monetary policy transmission mechanism” is 
to analyze whether private sector claims in our model adds any explanatory power to any 
of the macroeconomic variables. The results for the pair-wise granger causality using the 
diagnosis of VAR lag structure are shown below. The number indicates the p-value based 
on the Wald statistics for the joint significance of each of the other lagged endogenous 
variables in the equation. The null hypothesis for the pair production – private (shown in 
bold) loans is that private loans does not Granger-cause production. 
 1. INDIA: 
Production 
Exclude Prices Exchange 
Rate 
Pvt. 
Loans 
Deposits Money Spread Bank 
Rate 
All 
Prob. 0.3730 0.0001 0.6466 0.1120 0.0001 0.5724 0.1020 0.0000
Prices 
Exclude Production Exchange 
Rate 
Pvt. 
Loans 
Deposits Money Spread Bank 
Rate 
All 
Prob. 0.0239 0.1717 0.8930 0.2551 0.2660 0.8783 0.8646 0.0000
 
2. PAKISTAN: 
Production 
Exclude Prices Exchange 
Rate 
Pvt. 
Loans 
Deposits Money Spread Bank 
Rate 
All 
Prob. 0.1345 0.0072 0.0728 0.6298 0.3802 0.2942 0.2560 0.0000
Prices 
Exclude Production Exchange 
Rate 
Pvt. 
Loans 
Deposits Money Spread Bank 
Rate 
All 
Prob. 0.0002 0.1772 0.1828 0.0145 0.0571 0.2221 0.6829 0.0000
Table 5: Granger Causality Results: Private Sector Loans on Production and CPI 
A high p-value does not reject the null hypothesis, while a low p-value (less than 
10%) rejects the null hypothesis. The results seem to indicate that private loans granger 
cause output in Pakistan. This re-iterates the earlier results about the existence of 
relationship between private loans and production in Pakistan. While for India, the null 
can not be rejected. Hence, it can not be said that private sector loans causes production. 
But since Granger causality measures precedence and information content but does not 
by itself indicate causality in the more common use of the term. The rejection of null 
does not mean that there is no relationship between private loans and production. Hence, 
the Granger causality result for India is ignored. The paper still treats previous part’s 
results as established for both the countries. 
Finally, the unrestricted VAR estimation is done using 4 lags of each endogenous 
variable in the model. On examining the relevant relationship coefficients, the lagged 
values of “monetary policy” variables (money and interest rates) are significant in 
predicting the credit variable (private sector claims) for both the countries. The 
coefficients of the interest rate are not as significant as those of the money. The credit 
variable (and its lags) also seems very significant in explaining the macroeconomic 
variables. 
 Thus, the unrestricted VAR also indicates that there is bank lending channel 
present in these countries. 
1.2 Impulse Responses  
A shock to the policy variable not only directly affects that variable but is also 
transmitted to all of the other endogenous variables of the economy through the dynamic 
(lag) structure of the VAR. An impulse response function traces the effect of a one-time 
monetary policy shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of these 
variables. 
Responses of Macroeconomic variables (Output, Prices) to Cholesky One S.D. 
Innovations in Policy variables (Money, Interest Rate) along with responses of 
intermediate credit variables (loan demand and loan supply) are shown in figure 6 and 
figure 7.  
The cholesky impulse is used, which imposes an ordering of the variables in the 
VAR and attributes all of the effect of any common component to the variable that comes 
first in the VAR system. The graph shows the plus/minus two standard error bands about 
the impulse responses. 
One important thing to notice is that as a result of positive innovation in money 
the mean response of private loans goes down (the usual predicted response is that loans 
should go up). However, a zero response lies within the two standard deviation band.  
As is clear from figure 6 and 7, these impulse responses show that for both India 
and Pakistan shocks in interest rates and money affect output and prices. While the output 
returns to initial level, the effects on prices are persistent. The shocks in interest rates and 
money also affect the credit variable, it goes down and then goes up (further than initial 
level). The final level of credit variable after the interest rate shock is above the initial 
level for Pakistan (while for India it is somewhat below the starting value). Basically, the 
figures show changes in money induce a change in private sector loans and the real 
economic variables (output and prices) respond to these changes in the loans.  
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOGPRODUCTION to LOGMONEY
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LOGPRODUCTION to BANKRATE
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOGCPI to LOGMONEY
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOGCPI to BANKRATE
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOGPVTLOANS to LOGMONEY
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOGPVTLOANS to BANKRATE
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOGDEPOSIT to LOGMONEY
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOGDEPOSIT to BANKRATE
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Figure 4: Cholesky Impulse (MP Shocks) Responses (Macroeconomic variables) for India 
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Figure 5: Cholesky Impulse (MP Shocks) Responses (Macroeconomic variables) for Pakistan 
Hence the impulse responses indicate that the bank lending channel seem to be 
operative and the shocks in money and interest rates are transmitted to the real side of 
economy (output and prices) via the changes in private loans (credit variable).  These 
observations are in agreement with previous results, indicating the presence of bank 
lending. 
1.3 Variance Decomposition  
While impulse response functions trace the effects of a shock to one endogenous 
variable on to the other variables in the VAR, variance decomposition separates the 
variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks to the VAR. Thus, the 
variance decomposition provides information about the relative importance of each 
random innovation in affecting the variables in the VAR. 
The variance decomposition of the VAR model shows that exchange rate and 
money play more important role than interest rate or term spread in determining the 
private sector claims. Similarly an innovation in private sector claims affects the 
production somewhat significantly, but not the price levels. The results are alike for both 
the countries and are in agreement with previous results. 
2. Structured (Identified) VAR  
The main purpose of structural VAR (SVAR) estimation is to obtain non-
recursive orthogonalization of the error terms for impulse response analysis. This 
alternative to the recursive Cholesky orthogonalization requires the user to impose 
enough restrictions to identify the orthogonal (structural) components of the error terms. 
2.1 Short Term restrictions  
The ordering used to put short term restrictions is: 
1. output    2.cpi     3.deposit    4. loans 
5.exchange-rate  6.spread   7.interest rate   8.money 
This kind of identification scheme is used by other researchers as well (McMillin, 
1999). The assumption that monetary policy affects output and prices only with a lag and 
that it has a contemporaneous effect upon the exchange rate is uncontroversial. With 
same kind of reasoning monetary policy will have more immediate effect on private 
sector loans and demand deposit (since monetary policy affects these variables first, 
which in turn transmit the monetary shocks to the real economy). 
 The SVAR is identified by specifying the standard short run restriction matrices. 
That is for the relationship ut = Γ-1et, between reduced form and structural disturbances, 
Γ-1 is restricted as the lower triangular matrix. 
The impulse response results are shown in figures 8 and 9. 
Notice that, the “credit variable” gets affected by shocks in either of the monetary 
policy instruments, and gets back to its initial level. The same is true for the output levels. 
But for both the countries, this identification scheme shows a permanent effect of 
monetary policy on consumer prices for both the countries. So the results of this SVAR 
analysis are similar as the earlier results. 
2.2 Long Run restrictions 
One advantage of the use of LR is that no restrictions are placed on the 
contemporaneous relations among the variables. Thus, a restriction that monetary policy 
shocks have no contemporaneous effects on output or prices is not imposed, as was done 
in the short run scheme (lower triangular).   
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LOGMONEY BANKRATE
Response of LOGPRODUCTION to Cholesky
One S.D. Innovations
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LOGMONEY BANKRATE
Response of LOGCPI to Cholesky
One S.D. Innovations
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LOGMONEY BANKRATE
Response of LOGPVTLOANS to Cholesky
One S.D. Innovations
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LOGMONEY BANKRATE
Response of LOGDEPOSIT to Cholesky
One S.D. Innovations
 
Figure 6: Impulse Response of SVAR with Short Run restrictions for INDIA 
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Figure 7: Impulse Response of SVAR with Short Run restrictions for PAKISTAN 
 
The first restriction used to identify the monetary policy shock is that money or 
interest rates shocks have no long-run effects on output. A second restriction is that 
monetary policy shocks have no long-run effects on the interest rate. These are familiar 
results from a sticky-wage/price aggregate demand-aggregate supply-type model with IS-
LM underlying aggregate demand. Interest rate and spread are not affected by any of the 
other variables. It is also assumed that exchange rate or price level does not have any 
influence on output in long run. 
The model is estimated applying these long run restrictions. The results of 
estimations (the matrix Γ-1) are as shown in tables 7 and 8. The coefficient in each cell 
represents the contemporaneous relationships of error terms/ shocks of row variable with 
the different column variables. 
As can be seen from these tables, private sector loans have a positive relationship 
with the shocks in money (and negative relations with shocks in interest rate and spread). 
The changes in the private sector claims affect the output positively. The results show 
that the relationships of policy instruments with credit variable and of credit variable with 
macroeconomic activities exist in these economies. 
Impulse responses for this identification are similar to the ones obtained from 
contemporaneous restrictions earlier. 
Hence the detailed estimation, again affirms the preliminary investigation results 
of bank lending channel being present in these countries as a mechanism of monetary 
policy transmission. It reveals that shocks in the policy instruments (interest rates and 
money) transmit to the macroeconomic activities (production and prices) of these 
economies via the bank lending channel (credit variable).  
 Estimated Relationship matrix: INDIA 
 Output Prices Exchange 
Rate 
Pvt. Sector 
Loans 
Deposits Money Spread Interest Rate
Output -0.409397 
(0.019335) 
-0.456411
(0.005022)
-0.020028 
(0.003028)
-0.495360 
(0.060161)
 0.625472 
(0.002394)
-0.441435 
(0.022934) 
 0.003789
(0.086403)
-0.000865 
(0.059351)
Prices -0.001042 
(0.004691) 
-0.011334
(0.059351)
-0.007838 
(0.065948)
-0.234446 
(0.098731)
 0.011189 
(0.019856)
-0.003741 
(0.008329) 
-0.003790
(0.050527)
-0.000523 
(0.003305)
Exchange Rate  4.985983 
(0.085794) 
 5.557096
(0.030483)
 0.179344 
(0.004653)
 6.029751 
(0.069745)
-7.552790 
(0.024772)
 4.484849 
(0.003236) 
 0.159798
(0.046723)
-0.408838 
(0.054246)
Pvt. Sector 
Loans 
 0.036271 
(0.057635) 
 0.043570
(0.047625)
 0.007153 
(0.006423)
 0.041001 
(0.050385)
-0.041820 
(0.067574)
 0.758432 
(0.043593) 
 0.018747
(0.003785)
-0.207678 
(0.002368)
Deposits -0.533826 
(0.064862) 
-0.600091
(0.007534)
-0.012034 
(0.003541)
-0.665065 
(0.004924)
 0.876585 
(0.070456)
-0.596376 
(0.003588) 
 0.021716
(0.075623)
 0.036462 
(0.004763)
Money -0.206352 
(0.076357) 
-0.241505
(0.004562)
-0.001950 
(0.067635)
-0.277660 
(0.009471)
 0.342680 
(0.034565)
-0.251694 
(0.006523) 
 0.005550
(0.007024)
 0.011635 
(0.069913)
Spread  3.206759 
(0.068624) 
 3.458569
(0.013028)
 0.109651 
(0.063052)
 3.718781 
(0.053274)
-5.164326 
(0.049748)
 3.130781 
(0.079725) 
 0.243803
(0.019539)
 0.062175 
(0.004783)
Interest Rate -1.197172 
(0.007551) 
-1.054037
(0.045642)
-0.190304 
(0.029475)
-1.404653 
(0.054656)
 1.929425 
(0.009431)
-1.138668 
(0.089134) 
-0.142652
(0.064052)
-0.016091 
(0.005406)
Table 6: SVAR Estimations using Long Run identifying restrictions 
 
 Estimated Relationship matrix: PAKISTAN 
 Output Prices Exchange 
Rate 
Pvt. Sector 
Loans 
Deposits Money Spread Interest 
Rate 
Output  0.000276 
(0.006405) 
 0.003437 
(0.049164)
 0.004330 
(0.050236)
 0.277891 
(0.002057)
 0.026869 
(0.004531)
-0.042037 
(0.096291) 
-0.039933 
(0.005491)
 0.034302
(0.015374)
Prices  0.014752 
(0.020436) 
 0.009095 
(0.003465)
 0.002062 
(0.005759)
0.310291 
(0.054124)
-0.003242 
(0.067651)
 0.019144 
(0.009128) 
 0.002948 
(0.007431)
-0.012067
(0.065625)
Exchange Rate  0.158459 
(0.068545) 
 0.335979 
(0.043769)
-0.179822 
(0.003215)
-2.669775 
(0.013400)
-0.998229 
(0.006052)
 1.243500 
(0.054766) 
 0.732730 
(0.004334)
-0.153593
(0.072064)
Pvt. Sector 
Loans 
-0.006401 
(0.001605) 
-0.001878 
(0.004306)
-0.006972 
(0.001204)
-0.022109 
(0.005465)
-0.027566 
(0.034306)
 0.540360 
(0.095230) 
-0.012212 
(0.003651)
-0.402790
(0.002854)
Deposits -0.037021 
(0.033954) 
-0.036409 
(0.007504)
 0.006903 
(0.009020)
 0.077049 
(0.054763)
 0.041400 
(0.006932)
-0.067809 
(0.082062) 
-0.051723 
(0.005004)
-0.004009
(0.045043)
Money -0.017751 
(0.056690) 
-0.001982 
(0.004946)
 0.002578 
(0.003651)
 0.006497 
(0.004595)
 0.003402 
(0.003910)
 0.013366 
(0.045737) 
-0.011522 
(0.002307)
 0.001276
(0.006524)
Spread -0.072563 
(0.043065) 
 0.548751 
(0.000551)
-0.291594 
(0.019340)
-0.217812 
(0.006523)
 0.042878 
(0.008430)
-0.120213 
(0.061302) 
-0.088930 
(0.005641)
-0.116240
(0.020548)
Interest Rate  0.014761 
(0.073062) 
 0.447960 
(0.058302)
-0.492315 
(0.006103)
-0.369468 
(0.008209)
 0.104915 
(0.035052)
-0.025117 
(0.009305) 
 0.005054 
(0.041121)
-0.084015
(0.072503)
 
Table 8: SVAR Estimations using Long Run identifying restrictions 
 D. Explanations and Analysis of Results  
The results of econometric analysis in previous two parts should be analyzed 
keeping basic economical structure and the macroeconomic policies of these two 
countries in mind. While there has been evidence of association between movements in 
interest rate (or yield spread, to be more precise) and real economic activity in most of 
the developed countries, these kinds of results are virtually absent in the case of 
developing economies. In part, this is because in developing economies with 
administered interest rates yield curve has not been market determined. Moreover, both 
the countries started as agricultural economies with not very developed banking system 
and have struggled even with the stability of political regimes (especially in the case of 
Pakistan). Hence one can reason why the results for interest rate as monetary policy 
instrument are not as apparent as in case of developed countries. Even the presence of 
informal credit market, which is operable mostly in rural economies (forming a large 
percent of total till late 1980s), can be blamed for usual monetary policy shocks (interest 
rates) not affecting the loans that much.  
As mentioned earlier, the other important point to consider is that unlike 
developed countries, India and Pakistan have sought to printing of currency as a measure 
to finance the government deficit. Hence usual open-market operations loose some of the 
significance in impacting the real macroeconomic activity via credit channel.  
Now the results are compared with previous such works on the bank lending 
channel for developed and less developed countries.  
 
1. Comparison with Developed Countries 
Perhaps the simplest aggregate empirical implication of the bank-centric view of 
monetary transmission was suggested by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). They showed that 
for US, following changes in monetary policy, there is a strong correlation between bank 
loan and key macroeconomic indicators like unemployment, GNP etc. The simple OLS 
results in part-II show that this kind of aggregate level relationship exists in India and 
Pakistan. 
The presence and significance of bank lending channel as monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in developed countries like US, Canada or other European 
countries has been established by many research papers in past. These papers used 
different indicators or proxies for bank lending. For example, ‘ratio of bank vs. non-bank 
debt’ is observed to decline positive innovation in the federal fund rates16.  
In this paper due to availability of only aggregate level financial data, the credit 
variable used is “private sector claims”. The results show that there exists a significant 
relationship between this credit variable and macroeconomic activity (production). The 
levels of significance of bank lending channel shown in studies for developed countries 
should not be compared with results in this paper, because the credit variables used are 
different.  However, one fact to note is that the effect of interest rate shocks on the credit 
variable is not as significant as the effect of a shock in money supply. 
Another most commonly used variable, term spread has been shown to explain 
the presence of credit channel for the developed countries. Again since interest rate is not 
a very effectively used instrument in India and Pakistan, the spread does not seem to have 
much explanatory power for macroeconomic activity and hence can not be considered as 
a good indicator of bank lending channel for India and Pakistan (unlike the results from 
developed countries, where the spread is very promising credit channel variable).   
There are similarities in results of impulse response and variance decomposition 
analysis for these two countries and developed countries like US, Canada. The effect of 
monetary policy shock on output gradually dies, and output reaches the initial 
equilibrium level, while changes in prices are persistent.  
2. Comparison with other Developing countries  
Agung (1998)17 finds significant different responses across the bank-size classes 
to a change in monetary policy for Indonesia. In particular, a monetary contraction does 
not significantly influence lending by state banks, but it leads to a decline in lending by 
smaller banks. A lot of papers have focused on discussing the bank lending channel in 
European countries like Spain, Poland, and Sweden18 etc. Again many of these studies 
have been done on the micro level bank panel data, which unfortunately is not available 
for the case of this paper. But on aggregate level the results for India and Pakistan also 
suggest that a monetary policy shock induced by changes in money supply leads to 
changes in private sector loans, as is the case with many of the developing countries. 
Whether there is a distributional aspect of this relationship can not be inferred from this 
study due to data constraints.  
For Sweden households and firms are found to be constrained to bank lending, 
which imply that any policy induced shifts in the supply of bank loans should also cause 
real spending effects19. Similarly, it is observed that banks are significantly deposit 
constrained and that they have only limited access to external forms of finance, which 
suggest that banks may be unable to dampen the effect of slower deposit growth on loan 
growth. Similar studies have been done for Latin American countries like Chile, Brazil 
etc.20 For Chile Alfaro, Franken, García and Jara (2003) use the panel data of banks to 
identify the presence of bank lending channel. They introduce a new variable (low/ high 
quality ratio) to capture the asymmetric nature of different financial agents. But most of 
the studies have either focused just on identifying the determinant of bank lending using 
bank panel data or stressed only on analyzing the effects of monetary policy shocks on 
bank lending using macroeconomic series.  
This paper is unique in the sense that it attempts to address the both issues and 
create the complete picture of the economy vis-à-vis bank lending channel as 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Private sector loan is used as the credit 
variable and seem to have marginal predictive power on other macroeconomic variables. 
Hence the bank lending channel is present in India and Pakistan. The monetary policy 
shocks (specially the ones in money supply) are transmitted to real economic activities 
via this channel. 
3. Contrasts between India and Pakistan 
The results for India and Pakistan are similar in most of the aspects. Both the 
countries have bank lending channel present in their economies and it is a significant 
transmission mechanism for monetary policy shocks. For both the countries money 
supply appears to be the more effective in affecting the macroeconomic activities (via 
credit variable) rather than interest rate. But the discount rate in Pakistan appears to be 
much significant instrument that the bank rate in India. This may be attributed to the fact 
that Pakistan has a more market oriented and liberal policies compared to India which 
tried to follow the socialist approach.  
The discount rate shocks have a large positive impact on deposits and private 
loans, while the shocks in money have positive impact for deposits but give rise to 
negative movement in private loans in Pakistan. For India, the behavior of demand 
deposits is similar, but private loans move go up and down to the initial level as a result 
of shocks in either bank rate or money. The other contrast is the relative influence of 
money and interest rate shocks on deposits and loans. For Pakistan these responses for 
discount rate impulse are more in magnitude as compared to the responses for money 
impulse. While for India it is the other way round. 
V. Conclusions and Remarks  
As discussed above we can conclude that the bank lending channel has operated 
as a monetary policy transmission mechanism in India and Pakistan, with an independent 
but significant effect in terms of macroeconomic activity. The way that the bank lending 
channel seems to have operated in these developing countries is consistent with the 
international empirical evidence. First, banks are forced to curtail their supply of credit 
following a monetary policy shock. Second, the access of households and small/ medium 
sized enterprises to external financing is restricted following the drop in the supply of 
bank credit; third, the drop in the supply of bank credit has a significant influence in 
terms of macroeconomic activity.  
By pushing toward a better understanding of the way in which the bank lending 
channel operates as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy, this paper contributes 
to an improvement of understanding the economies of India and Pakistan. Another major 
contribution is the result that money also plays a non-trivial (rather significant) role in 
these economies. 
This study underscores few avenues for future research that may deepen our 
knowledge of the functioning of the credit channel, in general, and the bank lending 
channel, in particular, as transmission mechanisms for the monetary policy in these 
economies. First of all the need for better measurement and identification of the monetary 
policy shocks is eminent, especially in semi-controlled regimes, where open market 
operations are not the only instruments being used. Similarly measuring the costs for 
bank-dependent borrowers associated with a drop in banks’ credit supply as a result of 
changes in monetary policy is also very important. There is need to develop the 
methodology and framework to quantify the effects of policy changes. This would be a 
great help for policy makers to understand, foresee and hopefully control the transmission 
of unexpected shocks in the economy.  Since the bank lending channel theory relies on 
asymmetry of information among heterogeneous agents, improvements in assembling 
more comprehensive datasets at the microeconomic level would help testing these 
theoretical foundations more accurately.  
The other major area of focus should be the application of these theories and 
methodologies to analyze, to evaluate and to forecast the performance of various 
monetary policy stances. This could later be used as a useful tool for policy makers to 
choose right kind of actions for achieving their desired monetary policy objectives. Based 
on the feedback about the accuracy of predictions, these theories and methodologies then 
can be modified to enable researchers to come up with a more correct picture of real 
economies. 
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